This paper shows that official statistics substantially underestimate the net foreign asset positions of rich countries because they fail to capture most of the assets held by households in offshore tax havens. Drawing on a unique Swiss dataset and exploiting systematic anomalies in countries' portfolio investment positions, I find that around 8% of the global financial wealth of households is held in tax havens, three-quarters of which goes unrecorded. On the basis of plausible assumptions, accounting for unrecorded assets turns the eurozone, officially the world's second largest net debtor, into a net creditor. It also reduces the U.S. net debt significantly. The results shed new light on global imbalances and challenge the widespread view that, after a decade of poor-to-rich capital flows, external assets are now in poor countries and debts in rich countries. I provide concrete proposals to improve international statistics.
I. Introduction
There are two puzzles in international investment statistics. The first is a set of statistical anomalies. At the global level, liabilities tend to exceed assets: the world as a whole is a net debtor (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) . Similarly, the global balance of payments shows that more investment income is paid than received each year. Since the problem was identified in the 1970s, the International Monetary Fund has commissioned a number of reports to investigate its causes, and national statistical agencies have put considerable resources into improving their data. Yet despite a great deal of progress, large anomalies remain; many European securities, in particular, have no identifiable owner (Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe, and Tamirisa, 2010) .
The second puzzle is a theoretical challenge. Since the latter half of the 1990s, capital has been flowing from poor to rich countries. As a result, the rich world now appears to be a sizeable net debtor in the official statistics, dragged down by the U.S. and Europe.
While the literature has put forward possible explanations for the U.S. net debt and the rise in China's assets, 1 the negative net positions of Europe and the overall rich world remain largely unexplained. Despite this, many observers have grown accustomed to the view that external assets are now in poor countries and debts in rich countries. In the public debate, the view that "China owns the world" has become particularly popular.
Should it be correct, the implications for policymaking and open-economy modeling would be far-reaching.
My paper challenges this view. The negative net foreign asset position of the rich world, I argue, is an illusion caused by tax havens. International statistics fail to capture most of the assets held by households through tax havens: they overlook the portfolios of equities, bonds, and mutual fund shares that households own via banks in Switzerland and other countries with strict bank secrecy rules. This coverage gap explains many of the long-standing anomalies in global data. My computations find that around 8% of households' financial wealth is held through tax havens, three-quarters of which goes unrecorded. This stock of unrecorded assets is double the recorded net debt of the rich world ( Figure I ). Since a body of evidence suggests that most of the wealth in tax havens belongs to residents of rich countries, accounting for it turns the rich world into a net creditor. Despite a decade of global imbalances, therefore, external wealth is still probably in rich countries overall: China does not own the world yet. Back in the 1980s-1990s the rich world had a large positive net position; over the last decade it has eaten some of its claims away; but today poor countries are still repaying their debts to advanced economies. Taking a global perspective on external positions, the net foreign wealth of the rich world and the poor world seem to converge, as if output convergence went hand in hand with wealth convergence -a plausible yet far from systematic outcome in standard models.
These findings have direct implications for core issues in international macroeconomics. On the basis of plausible assumptions, accounting for the wealth in tax havens turns the eurozone, officially the world's second largest net debtor, into a net creditor.
It also improves the U.S. net position. Now, the net foreign asset position is a key state variable in dynamic macroeconomic models. Accurate net positions are essential to assess the merits of the different views put forward on the causes of global imbalances and they are important to monitor financial stability. A large body of literature has questioned the sustainability of global imbalances.
2 If indeed the net positions of Europe and the U.S.
are higher than in the official statistics, the required international adjustment is smaller than commonly thought. Domestic imbalances and public finance issues may be more serious today for rich countries than global imbalances: rich countries taken as a whole are richer than we think, but some of their wealthiest residents hide part of their assets in tax havens, which contributes to making governments poor. So far, tax havens have been ignored by the literature that studies the evolution of top income shares around the world (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011) .
3 My findings, therefore, also have implications for 2 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) , Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) , Gourinchas and Rey (2007) , the papers in Clarida (2007) , Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2007) , Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock (2008) , and Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) among others.
3 The two exceptions are Roine and Waldenström (2009) who use anomalies in Sweden's balance of 3 this strand of research. My macro-based estimate of the funds held through tax havens could be used as a first step to include these funds into micro-based studies of income and wealth distributions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II begins with a brief primer on the activities that take place in tax havens and the statistical issues involved. Section III analyses a previously unused official dataset from the Swiss National Bank. A considerable amount of wealth is held unrecorded in Swiss accounts, and contrary to popular belief, this wealth mostly belongs to residents of rich countries. Section IV then presents a novel method to estimate the wealth in all the world's tax havens, using anomalies in the aggregate portfolio stock data of countries (the key data source here is Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007 ). My method is indirect and relies on data with known imperfections, so it is subject to some margin of error. Section V presents consistency and robustness checks, based on bilateral and flow data from the IMF, suggesting that the order of magnitude I find is reliable. The many datasets used in this paper all paint the same picture: households own a large amount of mutual fund shares through unrecorded accounts in tax havens. In Section VI, I propose scenarios as to how including the unrecorded assets in the statistics would affect published international investment positions, and I discuss the implications for global imbalances. The conclusion provides concrete proposals to improve the official data (Section VII). There are numerous intricacies in the financial activities of tax havens and the international statistics. The most important ones are discussed in the paper; the others are detailed in a comprehensive Online Appendix.
II. Tax Havens and Their Implications for International Statistics
First, let's look at the basic concepts that will be used throughout the paper. A country's foreign assets and liabilities are recorded in its international investment position (IIP).
The IIP is the stock equivalent of the financial account of the balance of payments: the payments to approximate capital flight, and Dell, Piketty, and Saez (2007) who use Swiss tax data to put an upper bound on the amount of capital income earned in Switzerland by non-resident taxpayers. Tax data, however, are not an appropriate source in this case, because the bulk of income earned by foreigners in Switzerland does not have to be declared to Swiss tax authorities.
4
IIP shows the stock of existing cross-border investments at the end of each year, while the balance of payments shows the yearly flow of new investments. There are three broad categories of cross-border investments: direct investments (holdings of over 10%), portfolio securities (equities and bonds that do not qualify as direct investment), and other assets (mainly loans and deposits).
4 At the end of 2008, as shown by Table I, securities were the largest category: they accounted for $40tr out of $90tr.
Tax havens host numerous financial activities. About half of the world's foreign direct investments are routed through tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands.
Many investment funds and financial vehicles are incorporated offshore. Luxembourg is the second largest mutual fund center in the world after the U.S; a great deal of the world's money market funds are incorporated in Ireland; and most hedge funds are in the Cayman Islands. Multinational corporations routinely use tax havens for treasury operations and group insurance (Bermuda is a leader here). Some of these activities have legitimate roles and are satisfactorily covered in the statistics. 5 My paper focuses on one specific tax haven activity: personal wealth management, sometimes known as "private banking". This activity is present in many but not all tax havens. Leaders include countries with strict bank secrecy rules such as Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Jersey. Banks incorporated in these countrieswhich are often subsidiaries of large global banks -attract foreign individuals and provide them with investment advice and services. In the IIPs of countries, the personal wealth management activities of tax havens do not affect direct investments data, slightly affect "other assets", but cause large, systematic errors in portfolio securities statistics.
II.A. How Cross-Border Securities Should be Recorded in Principle
To see what errors occur in portfolio data, denote A ij the amount of securities issued by country j, owned by residents of country i = j. To measure A ij , the data collection system of each country i covers some agents directly and others indirectly (IMF, 2002) .
4 On the asset side of official IIPs, statisticians isolate a fourth category, reserve assets, which includes the portfolio securities and other assets held by central banks. In this paper, "securities" will always include the fraction of reserve assets invested in securities.
5 See for instance IMF (2000) .
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Financial corporations such as banks, investment funds, and insurance companies, are direct reporters. They provide data on their own holdings (the securities that are on their balance sheets) and on their clients' holdings (the securities that are off their balance sheets, but that they can observe). Governments and nonfinancial corporations above a certain size threshold are also direct reporters. By contrast, households are indirectly covered, for practical reasons. Their holdings are reported by financial companies.
Trusts, personal wealth-holding companies, and other small nonfinancial corporations are indirectly covered as well; for the purpose of this paper, the best thing to do is to include them in the household sector. We can therefore write A ij as the sum of the foreign securities owned by the directly covered agents (a ij ) and by households (ã ij ).
All types of investors entrust their securities to domestic or to foreign banks for custody. Through to the 1960s, all securities existed in the form of paper certificates that were deposited in safe places such as bank vaults. Keeping their clients' certificates safe was the custodians' job. Today, paper has been replaced by electronic records, but investors still use custodian banks as book-keepers and for other services. Let's denote the custodian's country of residence with a superscript letter:
To fix ideas, consider a portfolio of U.S. (j) equities held by a household living in France (i). This portfolio can either be entrusted to a French bank -in which case we will say that it is held onshore -or to an offshore bank, say in Switzerland (k).
Offshore banks provide investment advice and services just like onshore banks do.
But they also provide opportunities to evade personal income taxes. In most non-haven countries, onshore banks automatically report the investment income earned by their clients to the tax authorities. Such third-party reporting makes tax evasion impossible.
By contrast, in tax havens with strict bank secrecy rules, banks do not generally report information. Taxes can be collected only if taxpayers self-declare their income.
International investment statistics work on the basis of the residence principle (IMF, 6 1993 
III.A. The Level and Composition of the Offshore Fortunes in Switzerland
The first striking result, reported in the first column of 
III.B. Who Owns Swiss Bank Accounts?
The last contribution made by the Swiss data is to provide unique evidence as to the likely owners of unrecorded fortunes in tax havens. Since 1976, the SNB has published a full country breakdown of the owners of fiduciary deposits.
Country breakdowns are puzzling at first glance. As Figure as nominal owners of Swiss accounts has a long tradition, dating back to at least the end of the Second World War (Schaufelbuehl, 2009) . Once you understand the purposes that sham corporations serve, it becomes clear that most fiduciary deposits assigned to tax havens by the SNB belong to residents of rich countries, in particular to Europeans.
A sham corporation adds a layer of secrecy between the owner of a Swiss account and his holdings, making it harder for tax authorities to investigate cases of tax evasion. 
IV. An Estimate of the Global Offshore Wealth
Switzerland is not the only tax haven that offers wealth management services to foreign individuals. Just like in Switzerland, banks incorporated in the Bahamas, Singapore, and other havens with strict bank secrecy rules attract foreign individuals and provide them with similar private banking services -securities custody and investment advice. 14 The goal of this Section is to present a novel method to estimate the amount of wealth held by individuals through all the world's tax havens. The method is independent from the official Swiss statistics, which will enable us to check its results against the Swiss data.
IV.A. Using Anomalies in Countries' Portfolio Securities Data
The method exploits the anomalies that the personal wealth management activities of tax havens cause in the portfolio securities data of countries. Take the typical investment revealed by the Swiss data: French residents who own Luxembourg fund shares through 13 See Appendix, Table A26 .
14 The testimony of a former Cayman banker can be read in U.S. Senate (2001) . Many of the large global banks have subsidiaries with private wealth management activities in Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, and so on. Based on interviews with offshore wealth managers, the Boston Consulting Group (2009) estimates that about a third of the global offshore wealth is in Switzerland; 20% in Jersey, Guernsey, and Ireland; 20% in the Caribbean and the U.S.; 15% in Luxembourg; 10% in Singapore and Hong Kong.
their Swiss accounts. (In turn, the Luxembourg funds invest in U.S. bonds, German equities, and so on, but forget about the investments made by the funds: they are irrelevant for the argument). These fund shares should be recorded as portfolio assets for France and liabilities for Luxembourg.
15 In practice, France has no way to record assets.
Luxembourg statisticians duly record portfolio liabilities -they are aware that foreigners own shares of domestic funds. 16 And Switzerland rightly records nothing on its balance sheet. Portfolio liabilities are bound to exceed assets globally.
The exact same argument applies when you replace France by any country i whose households use tax havens (say the U.S.), Switzerland by any tax haven k that hosts personal wealth management activities (say the Bahamas), and Luxembourg by any country j that attracts investments or where a lot of mutual funds are incorporated (say the Tax havens are also bound to cause anomalies in flow data. First, statisticians usually compute dividends and interest income by applying representative yields to stock 15 In international investment statistics, mutual funds are treated as regular corporations, they are never made transparent. All mutual fund shares are classified as a type of portfolio equities (even the shares issued by mutual funds that only invest in bonds). This statistical convention can be seen as bizarre, but it is uniformly applied across the world. To clarify matters, I keep the word "equity" for regular portfolio equities and distinguish equities from fund shares.
16 Note that the investments made by Luxembourg funds are also duly recorded: U.S. equities purchased by the funds will be recorded as portfolio assets for Luxembourg and liabilities for the U.S. Further, imagine that the funds in Luxembourg are in fact affiliates of German financial companies. In top of everything else, Luxembourg will record a direct investment liability and Germany an asset. The value of the direct investment will be the residual net worth of the funds (e.g., the value of the funds' offices), which is very small compared to the funds' gross portfolio assets and liabilities. Any error here does not affect the argument.
positions, because observed positions are considered more reliable than flows.
17 If some securities are missing from the stocks, then Anomaly 2 follows:
Anomaly 2: More cross-border dividends and interest will be paid than received globally.
Second, offshore banks do not only provide custody but also brokerage services: they buy and sell securities on behalf of their clients. Take a U.S. individual who purchases U.K. equities from her account in the Bahamas. In principle, Bahamian statisticians will notice that the buyer is not a resident of the Bahamas, so in keeping with the residence principle they will not record any equity purchase. 18 The U.K., by contrast, will duly record a sale. Before purchasing equities from her Bahamian account, a U.S. saver must first send funds to the Bahamas. One way to send funds offshore is by means of a wire transfer.
Such transfers cause a fourth type of anomaly.
Following the double-entry bookkeeping system used in balance of payments accounting, a U.S.-Bahamas wire transfer must be recorded twice in the U.S. balance of payments:
both as an "other investment" credit (funds flow from a U.S. bank to a Bahamian bank) and an "other investment" debit (a U.S. person purchases a Bahamian asset, namely a Bahamian bank deposit). 19 In practice, a credit will be recorded -interbank flows of funds are easy to capture. But U.S. statisticians may fail to record the balancing debit, because it is challenging to identify which transfers, out of the trillions that occur every year, correspond to purchases of offshore deposits by households.
If statisticians fail to record a debit, then the U.S. balance of payments will exhibit negative "net errors and omissions". If they rightly record a debit, the flow data will be accurate but the positions will not. There will be a discrepancy between cumulated flows and stock positions. The discrepancy will show up as an "other change" in the statistics that attempt to reconcile flows and stocks as per the identity ∆Stocks = F lows + V aluation + OtherChange. We can use Anomaly 1 to compute the value of the assets globally held by households in all the world's havens provided we make two assumptions. On the asset side, we need to assume that the securities held by direct reporters (such as financial corporations and governments) and those held onshore by households are well measured globally (H1).
Second, the global amount of recorded portfolio liabilities must be accurate (H2). Under these assumptions, the global gap between identifiable portfolio liabilities and assets captures the value of the portfolios held by households through all tax havens. In this paper, my estimate of the wealth in all tax havens is equal to the difference between globally identifiable portfolio liabilities and assets.
At first glance, this estimation method might seem trivial and crude. It is neither.
It requires quite a lot of data, some of which have become available only recently and are assembled here for the first time. More importantly, although assumptions (H1) and (H2) are not fully verified in practice, they are reasonable starting points and the results are robust to relaxing them. The relatively good quality of portfolio stock data extends to other leading countries.
In response to a number of reports (IMF, 1987; , the IMF has launched in the 1990s a program to harmonize collection methods and spread best practices across the world (IMF, 2002) . Since 2008, in all leading economies portfolio asset data have been based on security-by-security surveys. These surveys collect information at the level of individual securities, allowing for extensive cross-checking and error spotting.
Some issues do remain. But as we will see, they are minor for the paper's results.
What they simply mean is that my method to compute the wealth in all the world's havens can only give an order of magnitude -not an exact figure as in the Swiss case.
IV.B. Data on Countries' Aggregate Portfolio Securities
To compute the value of the global offshore portfolio using Anomaly 1, we need aggregate portfolio securities asset and liability figures for all countries. The key source is the August 2009 updated and extended version of the External Wealth of Nations dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) , which covers 178 economies. In the database, portfolio position data come from published IIPs or in minor cases are derived by cumulating flows 20 The authors then go on by describing the problem in which we are precisely interested in this paper: "However, for smaller U.S. investors, directly purchasing foreign securities abroad without using the services of a large, U.S.-resident institution is increasingly easy. Such acquisitions will not be captured in the U.S. recording system but will most likely be recorded as liabilities by the counterparty country's measurement system. Because all countries face this problem, cross-border assets are probably undercounted worldwide."
and adjusting for valuation effects. In tax havens households not only own portfolio securities but also bank deposits.
Contrary to what happens for portfolios, offshore deposits do not go completely unrecorded in the international statistics. The major financial centers tell the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) how much deposits foreigners have placed in their banks.
In principle, French statisticians can use the BIS data to estimate the value of French residents' offshore bank deposits, which will then be recorded in France's IIP as "other assets." The IMF has been advocating the use of the BIS data by national agencies since the 1990s. Not all countries do so, however, and the BIS does not separate out corporate from household deposits.
In order to give a rough estimate of the global amount of household offshore wealth, I
assume in the first column of Table III households can also use tax havens to hold works of art and real estate.
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V. Consistency and Robustness Checks
My method to estimate the personal wealth globally held offshore is indirect, and as such subject to a margin of error. Future statistical improvements will make it possible to refine my estimate. In the meantime, this Section provides evidence that the order of magnitude I find is correct, robust to relaxing the key estimation assumptions, and consistent with independent flow data.
V.A. Using Bilateral Assets Data to Decompose the Assets-Liabilities Gap
A basic objection to my estimation procedure is that the global portfolio assets-liabilities gap may reflect data deficiencies unrelated to tax havens. How can we be reasonably sure that the gap mostly reflects household offshore holdings? Because of one key reason: the wealth does not vanish randomly, but following a specific pattern that closely mirrors what the independent Swiss data show.
28 Deposits are only partially recorded, because not all statisticians use the BIS data as inputs to their IIPs. And more importantly, the BIS data under-estimate the offshore deposits of rich countries' households, because they do not see through the intermediate wealth-holding structures that the holders of offshore accounts use. The Swiss bank deposits held by French savers through sham Panamanian corporations are assigned to Panama in the BIS data. This is a first-order concern (see Section III.B).
29 Whether these elements can explain the difference between my estimate and previous studies is a question that I leave for future research. Cross-border real estate, in particular, is an important asset class for households. I also disregard the wealth of individuals who live in tax havens. In its early years, the CPIS had important shortcomings. Initially, only 7 of the countries surveyed by the IMF conducted the security-by-security surveys required to accurately measure bilateral portfolio holdings. The majority of the entries in the CPIS were estimated by participating countries on the basis of ad hoc methods. Over the years, progress was made. In 2008, most leading economies conducted security-by-security surveys, including the U.S., the entire eurozone, and Japan. For these countries, the geographical allocation of assets is likely to be very accurate. To analyze the source of the global gap Ω we need bilateral portfolio assets data for all countries. I have therefore filled the coverage gaps in the CPIS. This is not problematic, because the CPIS has a very good coverage rate: it captures 86% of all cross-border securities in 2008. 31 All the leading industrial countries and the large financial centers participate -although the Cayman Islands only reports on its banks' portfolio holdings, disregarding its large hedge fund industry. To reach a 98-99% coverage rate, we only need to add data on four non-reporters: China, Middle Eastern oil exporters, Taiwan, and the Cayman Islands' hedge funds. We have reasonably good information about the investments these non-reporters make: we know that they invest in the U.S. a lot. To allocate some of the non-U.S. investments of CPIS non-reporters, I employ a gravity model of portfolio holdings. 32 The online Appendix extensively discusses the raw sources and methods used to fill in the gaps in the CPIS.
The CPIS follows the same conventions as other international statistics. The residence principle applies. Take an Italian saver who owns a share of a Luxembourg fund that in turn invests in U.S. bonds. In the CPIS, Luxembourg records a portfolio bond asset on the U.S., and Italy records a portfolio equity asset on Luxembourg... Unless the fund share is held through a Swiss account, in which case it cannot be observed by Italian statisticians. showed. We learned in Section III that foreigners own a great deal of Luxembourg and
Irish fund shares through their Swiss accounts ( Figure II) . We now observe that many of such fund shares have no identifiable owners globally ( Figure VII) . Banks all over the world, and not only in Switzerland, sell Luxembourg and Irish fund shares to their cus-32 As shown by Portes and Rey (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) , the gravity model fits cross-border portfolio flow and stock data well. Because I apply the gravity model to less than 5% of global assets, any error introduced by the model has negligible consequences. 33 These discrepancies have previously been documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and the ECB (2009) in the case of Luxembourg and Ireland, and suggested by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) in the case of the Cayman Islands, but my paper is the first to provide a consistent explanation for them. Section D.4. of the Appendix discusses the preliminary steps taken by the ECB to address the issue. Statistical agencies cannot do much until all tax havens disclose who owns the offshore portfolios in their banks (see Section VII).
34 Almost 100% of the equity liabilities of Luxembourg, Ireland, and the Caymans are fund shares.
tomers -simply because a considerable fraction of the world's mutual funds are incorporated in these two countries that do not withhold taxes on cross-border payments. 35 The specific pattern of anomalies in Figure When filling tax returns, taxpayers can choose to report income or not, since there is no automatic exchange of information between Cayman hedge funds and the IRS.
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35 One exception is that not many foreign funds are sold on the U.S. territory, because of restrictions put by the Investment Company Act of 1940. Statistics gathered by the European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA) show that Luxembourg and Ireland are the two leaders for the incorporation of mutual funds in Europe. At the global level, Luxembourg comes second to the U.S. But the U.S. withholds taxes on payments made by domestic funds to foreigners, which explains why in tax havens individuals own Luxembourg rather than U.S. fund shares.
36 It makes little sense for central banks or sovereign funds to invest in mutual funds (except in hedge funds and private equity funds) since they already pay wealth managers to design suitable investment strategies. The largest sovereign wealth fund, Norway's, discloses its portfolio on a security-by-security basis: it has virtually no assets on Luxembourg, Ireland, and the Cayman Islands.
37 See Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009, Table 30 p. 71) 38 A Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act passed in 2010 seeks to strengthen information reporting. For more information on the taxation of hedge fund investors, see Sheppard (2008) . I have no data on what fraction of offshore income goes undeclared in tax returns globally. In the U.S., the IRS estimates that personal income tax evasion through offshore accounts and hedge funds might cost up to $70bn
Why should we care that a considerable amount of Luxembourg, Irish, and Cayman fund shares have no identifiable owners? Because the funds in turn invest in U.S. equities and other securities. Since we do not know who owns a large fraction of the world's mutual funds, we cannot know who ultimately owns a large fraction of U.S. equities.
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The missing claims on France, Japan, and other rich countries in Figure VII can be attributed to the fact that through their offshore accounts savers directly invest in French equities, Japanese bonds, and other securities issued by rich countries.
40 Again this would be congruent with the Swiss data, which showed that households directly own equities and bonds in addition to their Irish and Luxembourg fund shares.
V.B. How Known Issues with Available Data Affect My Estimate
My estimate that about 6% of household financial wealth is held unrecorded in all the world's tax havens relies on two assumptions. First, global portfolio asset figures must accurately reflect the securities held by corporations and governments and those held onshore by households (H1); second, global portfolio liability totals must be accurate (H2). Here I briefly review the main known issues in countries' aggregate portfolio data and discuss how relaxing the two assumptions affects the results.
On the asset side, asset-backed securities and short positions are sometimes imperfectly recorded. These shortcomings, however, cannot explain the considerable amount of globally missing mutual fund shares. Another issue is that in the U.S., some hedge and private equity funds have been unaware of their reporting duties. This coverage gap probably explains part of the missing claims on the Cayman Islands. The Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Federal Reserve are working on improving their coverage of U.S. hedge funds. Looking forward, these data improvements will make it possible to identify which part of the missing claims on the Cayman Islands is due to reporting annually (Gravelle, 2009) . 39 Along these lines, Section C.2. of the Appendix reckons that at least 15% of U.S. cross-border portfolio equity liabilities have no identifiable ultimate owner.
40 In principle, these anomalies could also be attributed to problems in the 2008 CPIS and in my imputations. However, there is no particular reason why these problems should specifically cause anomalies for France, Japan, Netherlands, and the U.S., as in Figure VII . Note that France is also one of the leading mutual fund centers in Europe along with Luxembourg and Ireland, and that many multinational corporations are headquartered in the Netherlands.
problems within the U.S. financial industry, and which part is household wealth going unrecorded. In any case, the officially reported net foreign asset position of the U.S. is currently underestimated.
Second, published liability figures may be overestimated. Take a French person who owns French equities via a Swiss bank. From the viewpoint of international statistics, these equities are not cross-border claims, but they will likely be recorded by French statisticians as liabilities for France. In this case, the use of offshore banks by households does not bias asset data downwards but liability data upwards. However, such roundtripping does not affect the paper's argument. Too much liabilities are recorded globally, and the observed assets-liabilities gap still directly reflects household offshore portfolios.
Liability figures, on the contrary, may be under-estimated. Take a French saver who owns U.S. equities via a Swiss bank. U.S. statisticians will not always be able to record these equities as U.S. liabilities. But these equities will not be recorded on the asset side of the French IIP either. So accounting for them would both deteriorate the U.S.'s net foreign asset position and improve France's by the same amount. The wealth held in tax havens would be even greater than I have found.
In sum, available aggregate portfolio data do not always verify my two identification assumptions. In light of what we know today, however, there is no indication that my methodology substantially over-or under-estimates the wealth offshore. While future improvements in portfolio statistics will make it possible to refine my estimate, there is no particular reason to expect they could radically affect the order of magnitude I find.
V.C. Consistency Between Flow and Stock Anomalies
A last consistency check comes from the flow data. The global assets-liabilities gap Ω has its counterpart in the world balance of payments computed by the IMF independently from the present study. The IMF world balance of payments includes all countries' reports plus undisclosed IMF estimates for all non-reporters. It displays two inconsistencies.
First, more investment income is paid than received each year (Anomaly 2). In 2008, the discrepancy amounted to D=$156bn.
41 To see how this flow anomaly fits in with my estimated stock anomaly, denote r Ω the yield on the missing portfolios Ω -that is, the flow of missing dividends and interest divided by the stock of missing securities. A missing flow of $156bn implies a yield of r Ω =3.5%, consistent with the average yield on recorded cross-border securities.
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Second, barring one exception in 1998, there are more securities sold than purchased globally (Anomaly 3). Again, this anomaly fits in well with the portfolio assets-liabilities gap Ω. To see why, denote I t the net unrecorded purchases of securities, and V AL t the net capital gains on existing unrecorded portfolios. We can write the change in the stock of unrecorded portfolios Ω between t − 1 and t as Ω t − Ω t−1 = I t + V AL t . Table   IV breaks Ω down as per this equation. A reasonable pattern emerges: steady inflows, negative valuation effects during equity bear markets, positive valuation effects during bull markets, and reasonable yields r Ω throughout the period.
One anomaly that is not systematic in the data is "net errors and omissions" in 41 See Appendix Table A21 . 42 See Appendix Table A22 . 43 Section D.4 of the Appendix discusses five concrete case studies of transfers and how they should be recorded.
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VI. Implications of Tax Havens for International Imbalances
In 2008, globally identifiable portfolio liabilities exceed assets by about $4.5tr. The missing assets must belong to some countries. This Section proposes scenarios as to how accounting for the unrecorded assets affects international imbalances -both stock and flow imbalances, commonly referred to as "global imbalances." The scenarios are thought experiments such as: "What is the true U.S. net foreign asset position if the U.S. owns 20% of the unrecorded wealth?"; as such, they are speculative. However, a number of robust qualitative findings emerge.
VI.A. The Eurozone and the Rich World are Probably Net Creditors
As we have seen, about one-third of the missing assets can readily be attributed to households with Swiss accounts, and the remaining two-thirds probably belong to households with accounts in other tax havens. The SNB's statistics suggest that more than half the offshore wealth in Switzerland belongs to Europeans. Although we do not know who owns the offshore wealth in the Cayman Islands and Singapore, surveys of wealth managers give some direction. For instance, the Boston Consulting Group (2009) estimates that 42% of all offshore wealth belongs to Europeans and 60% to residents of rich countries. Table V presents scenarios as to how unrecorded assets affect the net foreign asset position of the eurozone, officially the world's second largest net debtor. Accounting for the offshore wealth in Switzerland alone considerably improves the eurozone's position.
If in addition the eurozone owns 25% of the offshore portfolios in the world's other tax havens, then it is balanced. If it owns 50% of all the unrecorded portfolios, it is in actual facts a sizeable net creditor. In all plausible scenarios, the eurozone shifts into the black. My benchmark scenario where the eurozone owns about half the unrecorded wealth and the U.S. 20% turns the overall rich world into a net creditor. This result is robust to alternative assumptions. Since unrecorded assets are double the recorded net debt of the rich world, the rich world shifts into the black as long as it owns more than half of them. Available Swiss data suggest that it is a lower bound, which is hardly surprising since residents of rich countries own 80% of recorded world wealth (Davies et al., 2011) .
Remember also that most of the unrecorded assets are Luxembourg, Irish, and Cayman fund shares. We have reason to believe that these fund shares belong in the main to Europeans (especially Luxembourg fund shares) and Americans (especially Cayman fund shares).
44 Developing countries have offshore accounts too, but plausibly not more than 30% of all offshore wealth: about 10% for oil exporters and 20% for non-oil developing countries is a reasonable take in light of available evidence. 45 Lastly, among rich countries, Japanese residents do not seem to use tax havens extensively -they own less than 1% of Swiss bank deposits -plausibly because capital income is much less taxed in Japan than in other developed economies.
46
VI.B. Implications for Global Imbalances
If indeed the eurozone is a net creditor and the U.S. less indebted than in the official statistics, then the net foreign asset positions of countries are globally less dispersed than we think. Along the stock dimension, international imbalances are still quite small. How does that affect our understanding of the dynamics of global imbalances?
Because sufficiently comprehensive portfolio data are not available prior to 2001, we cannot estimate the wealth held unrecorded before 2001. But we do know that capturing 44 Felettigh and Monti (2008) document that about half the foreign equity holdings recorded by Italy are in Luxembourg funds. The ECB (2009) considers that most of the missing assets on Luxembourg and Ireland probably belong to eurozone residents. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) document that Irish statisticians recorded five times more U.S. investments in Irish equities than U.S. statisticians did in 2004, so U.S. residents may own a significant fraction of the missing claims on Ireland.
45 The hypothesis that Middle Eastern oil exporters own 10% of the globally unrecorded portfolios Ω implies total portfolio holdings for Middle Eastern countries well in line with the literature, see Appendix Table A8 . Middle Eastern countries own 10% of Swiss bank deposits and non-oil developing countries 25%, see Appendix Table A26 . 46 In 2005, the OECD reports that the net personal tax rate on dividends was 22% in Germany, 32% in France, as opposed to 10% in Japan, and 18% in the United States. 
VI.C. Remaining Anomalies in International Statistics
The failure to record the personal wealth in tax havens is certainly not the only issue in the investment statistics of countries. Could other errors in the data offset the improvement in rich countries' IIP resulting from accounting for offshore assets? There is one necessary (though not sufficient) condition for countries' IIP to be accurate: globally, recorded claims should equal liabilities. Here I briefly discuss scenarios where this condition is verified.
Accounting for tax havens can entirely solve the global assets-liabilities discrepancy for one category of claims: portfolio investments. It can also explain why more investment income is paid than received, which is the key driver of the current account deficit that the world has tended to run up (Motala, 1997) . Two anomalies remain, however. First, contrary to the phenomenon found for portfolio securities, for foreign direct investments, slightly more assets can be identified than liabilities (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007, 
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The trade discrepancy also likely comes from errors in developing countries' statistics.
There is no particular reason to believe that exports are overestimated in rich countries.
In fact, the U.S. Census Bureau (1998) has argued that U.S. goods exports have tended to be systematically underestimated, by as much as 10%. In contrast, there is substantial evidence that the developing world underestimates its imports: Fisman and Wei (2004) have shown that China's imports from Hong Kong are systematically under-reported for tax reasons. Now, developing countries' IIPs are still mostly compiled by cumulating current account flows (in particular for the "other assets" category). If developing countries' current account balances are overestimated, then their net foreign assets are also overestimated. Once again, the developing world may be more indebted than we think.
47 Part of the direct investment discrepancy might also be due to real estate. U.S. real estate held by foreigners should be recorded as DI liabilities for the U.S. but is not. Curcuru, Thomas, and Warnock (2009) estimate that on net real estate increased U.S. liabilities of $565bn in 2007. This figure should be compared to my estimate that the U.S. missed at the very least $1tr in claims because of tax havens in 2008. Accounting for real estate, the true U.S. net position could be a bit worse than the computations in Table VI suggest -but the eurozone's position would then probably be even better than in Table V .
If the FDI and trade discrepancies are due purely to errors in developing countries' statistics, then they do not affect the results of this paper: when the world IIP is purged of all its errors, the rich world and the eurozone are net creditors, and the developing world is a net debtor. If each country contributes to the FDI and trade discrepancies in proportion to the size of its international balance sheet -a worst case scenario given the available evidence -the central conclusions of this paper still hold. The eurozone remains a net creditor -albeit smaller -and the rich world is roughly balanced.
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VII. Conclusion: Two Proposals to Improve Official Statistics
This paper takes a serious look at the enormous data challenges that the personal wealth management activities of tax havens pose for international data. The main finding is that around 8% of the global financial wealth of households is held in tax havens, threequarters of which goes unrecorded. Available evidence suggests that offshore assets belong in the main to residents of rich countries, in particular to Europeans. On the basis of plausible assumptions, accounting for the wealth in tax havens turns the eurozone into a net international creditor and significantly improves the U.S. net position. Contrary to conventional wisdom that views Europe and the U.S. as severely indebted economies, the rich world is still overall likely to be a net creditor. Much of the literature on global imbalances has been preoccupied with major divergence trends in current accounts and net positions that could ultimately cause a sharp drop in the dollar and recessions in rich countries. My results suggest that poor-to-rich capital flows may be a factor of convergence rather than divergence in the net foreign asset positions of countries.
Accurate foreign asset data are crucial to many research and policy issues. They form a key input for the analysis of patterns in capital flows. Countries with high recorded net foreign debt are labelled high risk, which has direct consequences on their borrowing terms and increases the chances of disorderedly adjustments. Better investment data would improve our ability to track fundamental aspects of globalization and to monitor financial stability. All of this calls for changes to be made to the way data are compiled. The combination of both reforms would enable statisticians to fill in the long-standing gaps in portfolio investment data. As this paper has argued, this would radically change the international investment positions of rich countries.
A third source can be used as input to the statistics on the external positions of countries: tax data. Tax data would be a reliable source if offshore financial institutions exchanged information with foreign tax authorities on an automatic basis. Since the beginning of the financial crisis, and under G20 pressure, a number of tax havens have started exchanging bank information with foreign countries. But they only provide information "upon request:" in practice, the amount of information exchanged remains negligible (Johannesen and Zucman, 2012) . Absent automatic information exchange, tax data may well remain an unreliable source to capture the offshore holdings of households. My estimate of households' unrecorded assets held in tax havens Note: The figure charts the value of unrecorded household assets in tax havens along with the officially recorded net foreign asset positions of Japan, the U.S., and Europe. All series are scaled by world GDP. In 2008, by my estimate, unrecorded household assets amounted to 7.3% of world GDP. Total household financial assets stood at 120% of world GDP (Davies et al., 2011) so unrecorded household assets amounted to 6% of total household financial assets. Europe includes the 16 members of the eurozone as at the end of 2010, five additional European countries (the UK, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland), and three non-European countries (Australia, New Zealand, and Canada). Source: Appendix Tables A3 and A27. S. residents owned 15% of the unrecorded assets held through Switzerland and 25% of those held through the other tax havens, the true net foreign asset position/GDP ratio of the U.S. averaged -12%. Source: Appendix Table A29 .
